





This paper proposes a model of the decision-maker’s conﬁdence in his proba-
bility judgements, in terms of an implausibility measure – a real-valued function
on the set of probability functions. A decision rule is axiomatised according to
which the decision-maker evaluates acts using sets of probability functions which
vary depending on the agent’s implausibility measure and on what is at stake in the
choice of the act. The framework proposed yields a natural notion of comparative
aversion to lack of conﬁdence, or ambiguity aversion, and allows the deﬁnition
of an ambiguity premium. It is shown that these notions are equivalent and can
be characterised in terms of the implausibility measure representing the agent’s
conﬁdence. A simple portfolio example is presented.
Keywords: Conﬁdence; multiple priors; ambiguity aversion; ambiguity premium;
implausibility measure.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81, C69.
1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal paper of Ellsberg (1961), and with increased interest in recent
years, the problem of choice under “ambiguity” has occupied decision theorists. With-
out wishing to enter into the debate about the correct deﬁnition of ambiguity, and the
correct model of choice under ambiguity (Epstein and Zhang, 2001; Ghirardato et al.,
2004; Wakker, 2001), we shall take a decision under ambiguity to be a case where
there might be uncertainty regarding the correct probabilities to use in the decision.
As such, the problem of choice under ambiguity seems to bring in the question of the
decision-maker’s conﬁdence about his probability judgements. He is fully conﬁdent
that the probability that a fair die falls on a one is a sixth: choice under risk is a case
of full conﬁdence. By contrast, although he thinks that the odds that the shares of a
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particular company B will rise are better than 0.8, he is not entirely conﬁdent in this
judgement (he acknowledges that it may be that the odds are only around 0.5): this is a
case of uncertainty about the probabilities, ie. of choice under ambiguity.
In the light of this relationship, the problem of understanding choice under ambi-
guity can be resumed in the following two questions: What is the best way to represent
the agent’s conﬁdence in his probability judgements? What role does his conﬁdence
play in his decisions? A popular family of models, initiated by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), use a set of probability functions in response to the ﬁrst question. Several rules
have been proposed which specify the role of such sets of probabilities in decision-
making (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Bewley, 2002; Ghirardato et al., 2004). In these
models, conﬁdence seems to be an all or nothing affair: the decision-maker is fully
conﬁdent of any probability judgement which is true according to all of the probabil-
ity functions in this set, and does not forward any probability judgements of which he
is not fully conﬁdent. Gajdos et al. (2008) develop this representation by supposing
that the appropriate set of probability functions is itself a function of an exegeneously
given set of probability functions, to be thought of as the “objective” information the
decision-maker has received. In their model, conﬁdence is still an all or nothing affair,
but rather than being ﬁxed, the proabability judgements in which the decision-maker is
(fully) conﬁdent are determined by his information.
In this paper, we propose a model according to which conﬁdence comes in degrees:
the decision-maker is more or less conﬁdent of different probability judgements. Us-
ing such a model, we propose a decision rule according to which the evaluation of a
prospect does not use a ﬁxed set of probability functions (as in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)), nor a set which is determined by some exegeneously given factor (as in Gajdos
et al. (2008)), but a set which varies with the conﬁdence appropriate for the prospect
under consideration. The guiding intuition behind the rule is that prospects in which
the “stakes” are larger require more conﬁdence.
Consider ﬁrstly the representation of the decision-maker’s conﬁdence. The basic
idea stems from the following truism: the more conﬁdent one is in a probability judge-
ment, the more tenaciously one subscribes to it or, equivalently, the less willing one
is forgo it. If the agent is conﬁdent that the probability that the shares of a particular
company A will rise is greater than 0.7, he will use this aspect extensively in your de-
cisions, where appropriate; by contrast, if he thinks that the probability that the shares
of company B will rise is greater than 0.8, but he is not very conﬁdent of his estimate,
he is less willing to rely on this belief in important decisions. Construed thus, con-
ﬁdence can be modelled by what we shall call a implausibility measure on the space
of probability functions, which assigns a real number (or inﬁnity) to each probability
function, representing its degree of implausibility. One probability function is at the
centre, ie. has implausibility 0: this is the agent’s best estimate of the probabilities
of the relevant events. The other probability functions are closer or farther away from
the centre: those which are closer are serious candidates for the correct probability
function, those which are farther are more implausible. The agent’s conﬁdence in a
probability judgement is given by this implausibility measure: the farther he has to go
to ﬁnd a probability function which disagrees with the judgement, the more conﬁdence
he has in it. If there are “close” probability functions which contradict the probability
judgement, his conﬁdence in the judgement is low.
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The idea is represented graphically in Figure 1:1 the points are probability func-
tions, and the concentric spheres contain probability functions which have an implau-
sibility less than a certain value. The larger conﬁdence in the probability judgement
concerning company A is represented by the fact that the largest sphere containing
only probability functions conﬁrming this judgement (the light grey sphere) contains
the largest sphere containing probability functions which all conﬁrm the judgement
concerning company B. This corresponds to the fact that the judgement concerning
A is conﬁrmed by all probabilities up to a higher level of implausibility (d1) that the
judgement concerning B (where the implausibility level is d2). Naturally, the implau-
sibility measure is a subjective element, describing the agent’s attitude (see Section
4.3.2).
It remains to specify how such a representation of the agent’s conﬁdence in his
probability judgements is involved in his choices. The intuition is simple. As we said,
the less conﬁdent an agent is in a probability judgement, the less willing he is to hang
on to and employ that judgement; accordingly, the less conﬁdent one is in a probability
judgement, the lower the stakes at which one is willing to base one’s choice (or bet)
on this judgement. If the agent is very conﬁdent that the probability that company A’s
shares rise is greater than 0.7, he will be willing to bet the monetary equivalent of u
units of utility on the share-price going up, even for large values of u.2 On the other
hand, if he thinks that the probability of company B’s shares rising is greater than 0.8,
but he is not very conﬁdent in this judgement, one might expect different behaviour:
whilst he may be willing to bet the monetary equivalent of u units of utility on the price
1Where p(A) is short for “the probability that the shares of company A rise” and similarly for B.
2By bet, we mean the simple prospect where the agent gains u units of utility if the shares go up and loses
u units if they do not; preferring to bet means that this prospect is prefered to a sure zero change in utility.
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going up for small u, he will be reticent to place such bets for larger u. He might be
willing to bet a beer on the movement in the stock price, but he wouldn’t bet his fortune.
The higher the stakes the decision-maker is willing to accept, the more conﬁdent he is
in the probability judgement underlying his choice; this intuition is behind the main
representation result in this paper (Section 2.2). Note that, to measure the stakes, we
do not use the (usually monetary) outcomes involved in the bet, but the agent’s utility
values for these outcomes; this ensures that it is the agent’s attitudes to his conﬁdence,
or to ambiguity, which are being considered, not his attitudes to risk.
Cashing this out, if the stakes involved in the choice of an option f are (f), then
the agent will use all the probability functions with degree of implausibility less than
(f) in his evaluation of f. We assume that he uses the maxmin decision rule over this













The abstract example considered above is suggestive of many applications; we shall
content ourselves with mentionning a few. For one, the probabilities and conﬁdence
in the example above are typical representations of an investor’s attitudes towards a
company A which is in his home market and company B which is quoted on a for-
eign market. Although he might think the home stock to be less likely to be lucrative
than the foreign stock, he is more conﬁdent in his judgement regarding the former; as
indicated above, under the proposed decision rule, this may translate to a higher in-
vestment in the home stock than in the foreign one. Of course, this sort of behaviour
has been observed: it is the so-called “home-bias”. We shall analyse a simple example
of this sort in Section 5. Another potential application concerns expert advice. People
often make decisions, and give advice, if the stakes are low (a beer, in the example,
or somebody else’s money), which they would not make, or follow, if the stakes were
higher (the money was their own). The model proposed here can account for this sort
of behaviour: though they are giving their best estimates, they are not conﬁdent enough
in the probability judgements underlying their advice to act upon it themselves.4
In Section 2 we introduce the framework and basic deﬁnitions, and we prove the
main theorem, which gives sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of a (suitably) unique
implausibility measure and utility function such that the agent’s preferences are rep-
resented by (1). In Section 3 we deﬁne a notion of comparative aversion to lack of
conﬁdence, which can be thought of as a sort of notion of comparative ambguity aver-
sion. We compare it to existing notions of comparative ambiguity aversion, deﬁne an
ambiguity premium, and offer a characterisation of these notions, in the style of an the
Arrow-Pratt characterisation of risk aversion. Section 4 is dedicated to extensions, vari-
ants, comments and discussion of related literature. Section 5 contains an application
to a simple portfolio problem.
3bxc = x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise.
4Thanks to Itzhak Gilboa for this example.
4Brian Hill Conﬁdence and Ambiguity
2 Preliminaries and Representation
2.1 Preliminaries
Let S be a non-empty ﬁnite set of states, with  the -algebra of all subsets of S, which
are called events. () is the set of ﬁnitely-additive probability measures on (S;).
Where necessary, we shall employ the weak topology on the set of ﬁnitely-additive
set functions; under this topology, a net of p 2 () converges to p if and only if
p(A) ! p(A) for all A 2 . X is a nonempty set of outcomes; a consequence
is a probability measure on X with ﬁnite support. (X) is the set of consequences.
(Simple) acts are simple measurable functions from states to consequences; A is the set
ofsimpleacts. So, foranactf, andastates, f(s)isalotteryoverX withﬁnitesupport;
for a utility function u over X, we will denote the expected utility of this lottery by
u(f(s)) =
P
x2supp(f(s)) f(s)(x)u(x). A is a mixture set with the mixture relation
deﬁned pointwise: for f, h in A and a 2 <, 0 < a < 1, the mixture af + (1   a)h
is deﬁned by (af + (1   a)h)(s;x) = af(s;x) + (1   a)h(s;x) (Fishburn, 1970, Ch
13).5 With slight abuse of notation, a constant act taking consequence c for every state
will be denoted c and the set of constant acts will be denoted (X). Similarly, both the
degenerate lottery taking value x 2 X and the constant act yielding this lottery will be
denoted x, and both the set of degenerate lotteries and the set of constant acts yielding
degenerate lotteries will be denoted X.
Here we think of the outcomes as monetary values, and thus generally assume that
X is the set of real numbers; in particular, it comes equipped with a dense, unbounded
weak order 6. We assume a preference relation  on A;  and  are deﬁned to be the
symmetric and asymmetric components of . Null events and null states are deﬁned
in the usual way.6
The following notion, mentioned in the Introduction, will be central.
Deﬁnition 1. An implausibility measure on () is a function d : () ! <>0 [
f1g which is continuous on [0;supp st: d(p)6=1 d(p)) and is such that d 1(0) contains
one element. This element is called the centre.
The terminology used here refers to the intuition that the probabilities are closer
or further from “acceptability”. It does not refer to any measure-theoretic structure;
the word “measure” is only adopted because “degree of implausibility function” is
clumsy. Implausibilitymeasuresarecontinuouswhereevertheytakenon-maximalnon-
inﬁnite values. The implausibility measures used here will be centred: there is just one
probability function with implausibility zero. This translates the assumption that if the
agent was forced to give his best estimate for the probability of any event, he could
come up with a single value (and the values he comes up with satisfy the probability
axioms). See Section 4 for a discussion of weakenings of this assumption.
The ordinal equivalent of the cardinal notion of implausibility measure is as fol-
lows.
5Here, Anscombe and Aumann’s “Reversal of Order” axiom is tacitly assumed to hold (Anscombe and
Aumann, 1963). As is standard in much work with this framework, this axiom is assumed to hold throughout
this paper.
6An event A is null if, for any acts f and f0 differing only on A, f  f0. A state s is null if the singleton
event fsg is null.
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Deﬁnition 2. For implausibility measure d on (), the order restriction of d, 6d is
the order on () deﬁned as follows: p 6d q iff d(p) 6 d(q).
Finally, for x 2 <, we deﬁne bxc to be x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise.
2.2 The Representation
We will pose several general axioms, most of which only involve standard properties
of preference orders. The standard properties are recalled in Appendix A. First of all:
Axiom A1 (Basic axioms).  satisﬁes non triviality, weak order, continuity, unbound-
edness of outcomes – for any f 2 A, there exists x;y 2 X, x  f  y – and
monotonicity on outcomes – for any x;y 2 X, x 6 y iff x  y.
By the standard argument, weak order, continuity and unboundedness of outcomes
ensure that every act has a certainty equivalent in (X) according to . Monotonicity
on outcomes ensures moreover that every act has a certainty equivalent in X: that is,
for any act f, there is a unique constant act in X which is -equivalent to it. We
will denote it by [f] and henceforth refer to it as the certainty equivalent of f. The
full strength of the monotonocity on outcomes conditions is not necessary, but greatly
simpliﬁes the exposition; see Section 4.
Axiom A2 (Determinate utilities). The restriction of  to (X) (the set of constant
acts) satisﬁes independence.
By the von Neumann-Morgernstern theorem, this axiom guarantees that there is an
expected utility representation of the restriction of  to constant acts. Let u be a utility
function representing these preferences.
Let us introduce the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3. For any f in A and any r 2 <, let f + r be the act taking values in X
such that u(f(s) + r) = u(f(s)) + r for all s 2 S.
f + r is well-deﬁned because the utility is strictly increasing, continuous and un-
bounded (by A1).
Deﬁnition 4. For f 2 A, let (f) =  minnon null s2S u(f(s)).
 is to be interpreted as the “stakes” implied in the choice of f. Roughly, it is the
most the agent could lose if he choses f. For further discussion of , see in particular
Sections 4.1.5 and 4.2.2. Note that  depends on the utility function u.
The basic idea is that the set of probabilities used in the maxmin evaluation of an
act will depend on the stakes of the act. Hence, acts with the same stakes will have
the same set of probabilities involved in their evaluation: the ordinary maxmin axioms
apply on the preferences between acts with the same stakes. However, some of these
axioms (for example uncertainty aversion) involve mixtures of acts, and a mixture of
two acts with stakes r may not have stakes r. It is not sufﬁcient to pose the axioms on
such a restricted set. Instead, we ask that the maxmin axioms hold on acts, when we
evaluate them as if they had the same stakes, say r. That is: to compare any two acts,
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ﬁrst we shift them so that each has stakes r; then we “evaluate” each, which, given that
we only have preferences, means taking the certainty equivalent; ﬁnally, we shift the
certainty equivalents back (ie. undo the shift that brought the stakes of the acts to r),
and compare the results. The gives the preference between f and g as if they both had
stakes r. Hence the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. For any real number r, the order r is deﬁned as follows: for any f, g
in A, f r g iff [f + ((f)   r)] + (r   (f))  [g + ((g)   r)] + (r   (g)).
For each act f, f + ((f)   r) is the “transform” of f which has stakes r, [f +
((f)   r)] is the certainty equivalent of this transform and [f + ((f)   r)] + (r  
(f)) is the certainty equivalent obtained by “undoing” the shift to stakes r.
Note that this deﬁnition and the intuition given above make sense because the
maxmin representation (which is obtained imposing the axioms below) is a linear
functional, so that these shifts do not change the preference order between the acts;
ie. for any f, g in A and any real number a, MMEUC(f) 6 MMEUC(g) iff
MMEUC(f + a)   a 6 MMEUC(g + a)   a (writing MMEUC(f) for the largest
minimal expected utility of f over a set of probabilities C).
Axiom A3 (MMEU). For all r, r satisﬁes monotonicity, C-independence and uncer-
tainty aversion.
These are the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maxmin axioms. They imply that
r can be represented by maximisation of minimum expected utility over a set of
probabilities.
We deﬁne the “unambiguous preferences” at r, for any r, as in Ghirardato et al.
(2004, Deﬁnition 3):
Deﬁnition6. Forr areal number, the unambiguouspreferenceorder atr, 
r isdeﬁned
as follows: f 
r g if f +(1 )h r g+(1 )h for all  2 (0;1] and all h 2 A.
Note that this order is not necessarily complete.
This allows us to formulate the axiom which “glues together” the representations
obtained using the previous axioms.
Axiom A4 (Consistency). For all r;r0 2 <, if there exists s 2 < with s > r and

s6=
r or s > r0 and 
s6=
r0, then r 6 r0 iff 
r0
r.
The following, largely technical, axiom ensures appropriate continuity.
Axiom A5 (Continuity). For any act g 2 A and any constant act c 2 (X), the sets
frjg r cg and frjg r cg are closed.
One ﬁnal axiom is needed to ensure centering:
Axiom A6 (Centering). There exists a maximal  2 < such that, for any r;r0 6 ,
r=r0 and both satisfy, in addition to the above axioms, independence.
We will say that a utility function is zeroed if  = 0. Note that, since  and hence
the r depend on u, this is indeed a condition on u.
These axioms sufﬁce for a representation of preferences by a decision rule featuring
conﬁdence, represented by an implausibility measure.
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Theorem 1. If A1-A6, there exists a zeroed utility function u : X ! < and an implau-
sibility measure on the space of probabilities d : () ! <>0 [ f1g such that, for












Furthermore, for any other zeroed utility function u0 and implausibility measure d0
representing  according to (1), there exists a positive real number a such that u0 = au
and d0 = 1
ad.
Of course, expected utility is the special case where d(q) = 1 if d(q) 6= 0.
3 Measures of conﬁdence and ambiguity aversion
The implausibility measure on the space of probability functions involved in (1) rep-
resents the agent’s relative conﬁdence in one probability judgement compared to an-
other: he is more conﬁdent if he has to go to a higher implausibility (further away on
the diagram in Figure 1) to ﬁnd a probability function which contradicts his probability
judgement. In this capacity, numerical values of distance are not required: the order
restriction of the implausibility measure (Deﬁnition 2) contains all the necessary infor-
mation. What the numerical values do provide, as Theorem 1 makes clear, is the link
between conﬁdence, utility (and in particular the “stakes” involved) and choice.
There may thus be two agents with the same order on the space of probability
functions (and in particular the same centre), the same utility function, but making
different choices, because of differing implausibility measures. Consider a pair of acts
f, g with the same “stakes” such that g is (weakly) preferred to f if one chooses using
expected utility and the centre probability. Suppose that the least implausible rung of
the order restriction where the maxmin rule yields a (strict) preference for f over g
is the smallest one containing a probability function q. The difference between the
agents comes out in the “stakes” up to which they are willing to continue to choose
(transforms of) g over (transforms of) f. The implausibility measures each associates
to q are different: the agent who gives q a larger implausibility will choose (transforms
of) g up to higher stakes that the one giving it a lower implausibility value. But the
stakes one is willing to bet on seem to be a good measure of one’s aversion to one’s
lack of conﬁdence in one’s probability judgements. The former agent can go to higher
stakes than the latter without his conﬁdence concerning whether probability q should
be taken into account entering into play; he is less averse to his lack of conﬁdence. This
reasoning provides the following notion of comparative aversion to lack of conﬁdence.
Deﬁnition 7. Let 1 and 2 be represented by the same utility and implausibility
measures which have the same order restriction on probabilities. Then 1 is more
averse to lack of conﬁdence than 2 if, for any f;g 2 A and any real number , if
f 1
r g for all r 6 , then f 2
r g for any r 6 .
8Brian Hill Conﬁdence and Ambiguity
To the extent that one’s conﬁdence in one’s probability judgements is related to
ambiguity (in the sense speciﬁed at the beginning of the paper), this can be thought of
as a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion. However, at ﬁrst sight, it differs from
notions of comparative ambiguity aversion which have been proposed in the literature.
Here is a deﬁnition of comparative ambiuguity aversion which mimics closely, in the
current framework, some recently proposed deﬁnitions.7
Deﬁnition 8. Let 1 and 2 be represented by the same utility and implausibility
measures which have the same order restriction on probabilities. Then 1 is more
ambiguity averse than 2 if, for any f 2 A and c 2 (X), if f 1 c then f 2 c.
Although the speciﬁcation that the utilities are the same is superﬂuous in this deﬁ-
nition, because it is implied by the condition (applied to constant acts), it is retained to
facilitate comparison with Deﬁnition 7. Below, we shall show that these two notions
of aversion to ambiguity or lack of conﬁdence are in fact equivalent.
Before, note that in this framework there is a natural notion of the risky option cor-
responding to a given ambiguous act. Suppose that the preferences satisfy the axioms
of Theorem 1 and that the centre probability is p. For any act f in A, we deﬁne the
risk-equivalent, cf, as follows: cf(s)(x) = p(f 1(x)), for all s 2 S, x 2 X. cf
is the constant act yielding the risky or “objective” lottery which is the same as that
generated by f, if the centre probability function (ie. the agent’s best estimate of the
probabilities) is used. We can use this observation to deﬁne the following notion of
ambiguity premium.
Deﬁnition 9. Suppose that the axioms of Theorem 1 hold and let f be an act in A. The
ambiguity premium of f is the unique solution of the following equivalence:
(2) f  cf+( )
We will henceforth write (f) for the ambiguity premium of f.
This deﬁnition is analogous to the classical deﬁnition of risk premium (Pratt, 1964).
The risk premium is the amount one is willing to remove from the actuarial value of
a risky option to obtain a sure amount indifferent to the risky option; analogously, the
ambiguity premium is the amount one is willing to remove from the risky lottery cor-
responding to the ambiguous act to obtain a risky lottery indifferent to the ambigious
act. A signiﬁcant difference is that the risk premium is measured in monetary units,
whereas the ambiguity premium, as deﬁned, is measured in units of utility. This dif-
ference is deliberate: given that ambiguity aversion comes “on top of” risk aversion –
witnessed by the fact that comparisons of ambiguity attitude suppose or imply that risk
attitudes coincide (Klibanoff et al., 2005; Epstein, 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacci,
2002) – it seems natural to deﬁne the premium on a scale where the risk aversion has
7This deﬁnition is closest to that in Klibanoff et al. (2005), who suppose the same second-order prob-
abilities for the two decision-makers, where we suppose the same order restrictions of the implausibility
measures. Given that we are working in the Anscombe and Aumann framework, and despite the fact that
the preferences here are not biseparable, this is similar in spirit to the deﬁnition in Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002).
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already been factored out. However, the difference is not necessary: with appropriate
modiﬁcations of the deﬁnition above, a deﬁnition of ambiguity premium in monetary
units can be given.
It turns out that comparative aversion to lack of conﬁdence is nicely characterised
in terms of the relationship between the implausibility measures. Furthermore, it is
equivalent to the comparative ambiguity aversion (in the sense of Deﬁnition 8) and to
the natural ordering of ambiguity premiums.
Theorem 2. Let 1 and 2 be represented by the same utility u and implausibility
measures d1 and d2 which have the same order restriction 6. The following are equiv-
alent:
(i) 1 is more averse to lack of conﬁdence than 2
(ii) 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2
(iii) for all f 2 A, 1(f) > 2(f)
(iv) d1(p) 6 d2(p) for all p 2 ().
Note that in the theorem the utilities have to be the same, not just the same up to
multiplicative transform: this is required because the calibration of d1 and d2 depends
on the utilities. By contrast, in Deﬁnitions 7 and 8, the zeroed utilities only need to
be the same up to multiplicative transform. Of course, if the utilities are the same up
to multiplicative transform, they can always be put into a form such that they are the
same.
4 Discussion
4.1 Properties and Assumptions
4.1.1 Outcome space The set of outcomes was assumed to be the reals, for the sim-
plest motivation of the ideas is in terms of monetary payoffs. However, this assumption
is stronger than strictly needed: any outcome space supporting an unbounded utility
function could be used. (The certainty equivalents, which are needed for the result,
are provided by the mixture structure on the consequence space.) Moreover, unbound-
edness is only really required for Deﬁnition 3, in its current form. It may be possible
to do without unboundedness, given sufﬁcient modiﬁcations to the deﬁnition and the
theorem.
4.1.2 Monotonicity on outcomes and unboundedness of outcomes As above, the
monotonicity on outcomes condition in axiom A1 was posed largely for reasons of
ease, and to focus the presentation on important matters. Naturally, a more subtle
version of Deﬁnition 3, with appropriate modiﬁcations of its uses, would be required
were this assumption to be dropped. By contrast, the unboundedness in outcomes
condition is required to ensure certainty equivalents. Note that it is a weakening of the
traditional monotonicity or dominance axiom (Appendix A), which could be used in
its place. Given the interpretation of the outcomes as monetary, both monotonicity on
outcomes and unboundedness of outcomes are standard assumptions in economics.
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4.1.3 Reference point The proposed representation assumes a special “zero” point
on the utility scale, in particular via the assumption of maximality of the  in the
Centering axiom (A6). This assumption is not particularly controversial empirically.
Since the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it has been widely accepted that
reference points may play an important role in decisions: one seems to take account of
the possible gains and losses with respect to a reference point, rather than the possible
total wealth values. It need not be assumed that the reference point is the zero monetary
gain or loss. Indeed, given that the stakes are deﬁned in terms of the worst-case loss, the
reference point is perhaps better thought of as a “satisfaction” level, perhaps monetarily
higher than the agent’s actual wealth, such that below this satisfaction level, the agent is
particularly careful with his choices. Technically, theories involving reference points,
such as Tversky and Kahneman (1992); Wakker and Tversky (1993), do not elicit the
position of the reference point, but assume it to be known; this practice is followed
here, with the maximality assumption in A6.
It should nevertheless be emphasised that this assumption is made partly for æs-
thetic reasons. Were it to be dropped, a representation theorem would be obtained
which differs from Theorem 1 in that: ﬁrstly, the centre of the implausibility mea-
sure (the probability with the lowest implausibility) may take a non-zero implausibility
value; and secondly, the utility will be unique up to positive afﬁne transformation, and
there will be a corresponding additive factor in the uniqueness clause concerning the
implausibility measure. Axiomatically, the only difference would be the dropping of
the maximality condition in Axiom A6. The idea that the centre probability has zero
implausibility, reinforced as it is by the diagram in Figure 1, is the main motivation for
including this calibration of utilities.
4.1.4 Linearity The proposal made here assumes and exploits a property of pref-
erences which cannot be accounted for by most traditional models; namely the non-
linearity of the evaluation functional on utilities. Consider the following pairs of
choices: between (x;A;y;Ac) and (0;S),8 and between (x 	 1000;A;y 	 1000;Ac)
and (0 	 1000;S), where A is an event, x, y and 0 are monetary values and x 	 1000,
y 	 1000 and 0 	 1000 are monetary values having utilities a thousand units less than
the utilities of x, y and 0 respectively. Under standard expected utility, and according
to the main theories of ambiguity mentionned in the Introduction, if the agent prefers
the ﬁrst bet to the sure amount, then he prefers the bet in the second choice as well.9
However, intuitively this may not be so: although he may be prepared to take bets
where he has “little to lose”, he might be reticent to take bets on the same events whose
outcomes are just additive transforms of the initial ones, but where he has “more to
lose”. This sort of behaviour seems related to conﬁdence: it is because of his lack of
conﬁdence in his probability judgement regarding A that he would not accept to bet at
high (utility) stakes. Although little experimental work has been done to date on the
differences in attitudes to ambiguity at different payoffs, note that in the domain of risk,
it is well-known that risk aversion increases as the payoff increases (Holt and Laury,
8Respectively: a bet yielding a gain of x dollars if event A occurs and a loss of x if not; and no gain or
loss, for sure.
9An important exception is the theory proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), where this behaviour only
occurs under the special case of “constant ambiguity attitude”. See Section 4.4.
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2002). We conjecture that a similar phenomenon holds for ambiguity.
4.1.5 Continuity Given that different acts are evaluated with respect to different sets
of probabilities, according to the stakes involved, one might be led to expect that there
is a lack of continuity. It is, however, unclear what sort of continuity is lacking. First
of all, the traditional continuity axiom on preferences is satisﬁed (A1). Secondly, the
implausibility measure which determines the set of probabilities to be used is contin-
uous. This ensures the following sort of “continuity in stakes”: for any act f, state s
and outcome x, let xsf be the act yielding x on state s and f elsewhere, and consider a
sequence xi
sf such that xi ! x. Writing U(f) for the evaluation of f as given in (1),
U(xi
sf) ! U(xsf) as xi ! x. Although lowering the outcome for a given state may
lower the stakes, and thus alter the set of probabilities used in the evaluation, there are
no “jumps” as one gradually raises the stakes again.
Another sort of continuity one might want would be “continuity in events”: that
a sequence of acts xAif, with x the minimal outcome of each act and the sequence
Ai tending to the empty set, tends to f. However, since the state space of ﬁnite, this
sequence must be ﬁnite, so convergence is not well-deﬁned. The extension of Theorem
1 to inﬁnite state spaces, and investigation of consequences for this sort of continuity,
is a topic for future research.
Let us consider one ﬁnal potential worry of “jumps” in evaluations of acts.10 Con-
sider xsf and f, for some state s and some outcome x which is below f(s0) in the
preference order, for every state s0. The worry is that, because larger sets of probabil-
ities are used in the evaluation of an act the lower the minimum value of that act, the
decision-maker might strictly prefer f to xsf, even when the probability of s is zero:
but it seems that people should (and perhaps are) indifferent between acts which differ
only on states of zero probability.
This apparently unwelcome conclusion is not as troublesome as it may ﬁrst seem,
for the notion of state of probability zero needs to be deﬁned more precisely in contexts
where there is ambiguity. Certainly, one does not want the decision-maker to have
strict preferences over acts which differ only on states that he is fully conﬁdent to have
probability zero; that is, on states such that the implausibility of them having non-zero
probability is inﬁnite. The non-nullness clause in Deﬁnition 4 guarantees that this is
indeed the case: the decision-maker is indifferent between xsf and f for null s.
One could ask for more: that the decision-maker is indifferent between xsf and f
where the centre probability functions assigns zero probability to s (or more generally,
where the implausibility of the probability being non-zero is greater than a certain
non-inﬁnite degree). This is not implied by the representation in Theorem 1; for this,
Deﬁnition 4 would have to be modiﬁed. Such a modiﬁcation would yield a “riskier”
decision rule than the one proposed here. Suppose, for example, that you think that
there is zero probability that the Fed will go bankrupt in the next ﬁve years, but you are
not fully conﬁdent – it is possible but implausible that there is a non-zero probability of
bankrupcy. Consider the choice between a particular investment plan which is insured
against the collapse of the Fed and the same investment plan where all the money is
lost if the Fed collapses. According to the modiﬁed decision rule just mentionned, you
10Thanks to Itzhak Gilboa for raising this point.
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will use the same sets of probability functions in the evaluation of the two options:
for certain pairs of investment plans, all of these functions will give zero probability
to the collapse of the Fed, so you will be indifferent between the two options. By
contrast, according to the decision rule axiomatised in Theorem 1, you will use a larger
set of probability functions in the evaluation of the second option (the one without
insurance). This set might contain probability functions giving non-zero probability to
the collapse of the Fed, even though the set used in the evaluation of the ﬁrst option
does not: hence you will, rightly it seems, strictly prefer the former option to the latter.
Evidently, the rule in Theorem 1 is “safer” than the modiﬁcation just mooted; there
are at least prima facie reasons for not considering the fact that it may treat functions
which differ on states which have zero probability according to the centre probability
function differently as a disadvantage.
4.2 Variants
4.2.1 Expected utility and maxmin The procedure adopted in Section 2.2 employs
well-known decision theories to represent the preferences over acts with the same
stakes: namely, expected utility and maxmin expected utility (MMEU). These are nat-
ural choices. If one thinks of conﬁdence in terms of nested “spheres” of probability
functions (as in Figure 1), with each sphere containing all the functions closer to the
centre than a particular distance, and if one accepts that the decision-maker is more
conﬁdent that the “right” probability function is in a sphere the larger the sphere, then
it is natural to work with sets of probabilities as in MMEU.
However, variants can easily be imagined. Most naturally, one could replace the
minmax rule with any rule which operates with (possibly different) sets of probability
functions, suchas-maxmin(Ghirardatoetal.,2004), forexample. Thiswouldinvolve
a modiﬁcation of the MMEU axiom (A3).
Similarly, one could replace the expected utility “centre”: instead of there being a
single probability function, there may be a set of probability functions, and one could
choose according to whatever rule one has decided on (maxmin in this case). Such a
representation is immediately obtained if one drops the Centering axiom (A6); see also
Section 4.1.3.
4.2.2 “Stakes”  The motivation for the notion of “stakes” used (Deﬁnition 4) is
obvious, if not beyond controversy: the agent judges what is at stake by the worst
possible outcome of the choice – in other words, by the most he has to lose. Challenges
to this notion of stakes do not affect the theorem proposed, for relatively little rests on
the precise deﬁnition of the “stakes” function . Similar representation theorems can
be proved for different functions ; indeed, the theorems are formulated in an almost
identical manner to that given.
There are naturally a myriad of stakes functions which could be proposed or dis-
cussed: for example, the difference between the maximum and minimum values of the
acts, the probability that the act takes values below a certain reference point (calculated
with the centre probability) or the expected utility of values below the reference point
(calculated with the centre probability). A full discussion of all the options is beyond
the scope of this paper. A sense of the sorts of issues is given in Section 4.1.5, where
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the use of the centre probability leads to a less “safe” decision rule. Rather, we shall
just stress two points.
Firstly, although the notion of stakes used here goes best with additive shifts of acts
(Deﬁnition 3), in particular via the deﬁnition of preferences “as if the stakes were r”
(Deﬁnition 5), other notions of stakes might go best with multiplicative shifts (where
addition in Deﬁnition 3 is replaced with multiplication). Secondly, different notions
of stakes imply different properties of the preference order. For example, nowhere is
monotonicity (also called dominance) posed as a condition on  (see Section 4.1.2).
However, with the deﬁnition of stakes proposed above, it is easy to see that  satisﬁes
dominance.11 However, with other stakes functions, although an analogue of Theorem
1 may hold, the resulting preference may not satisfy dominance; this is the case for
exampleifthestakesfunctiontakesthedifferencebetweenthemaximumandminimum
values of the act.
4.3 Ambiguity attitude
4.3.1 Other ambiguity concepts In Section 3, only a comparative notion of aver-
sion to lack of conﬁdence was deﬁned, which was intuitively and technically seen to
correspond to a sort of ambiguity aversion. In the model proposed above, aversion to
ambiguity is built-in (and so cannot be deﬁned), in much the same way as it is built into
the maxmin expected utility model, and for the same reason. This observation immedi-
ately suggests the following way of extending the deﬁnition to cover cases of neutrality
to ambiguity (or lack of conﬁdence) and of ambiguity seeking, and to distinguish be-
tween these cases and ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion occurs when the agent
chooses according to the rule in (1). Ambiguity neutrality occurs when he always
chooses according to the expected utility with the centre probability (the conﬁdence,
represented by the implausibility measure, plays no role). He is ambiguity seeking if
he chooses according to a rule which is as (1) except that minima are replaced by max-
ima (cf. the maxmax rule swaps maxmin ambiguity aversion for ambiguity seeking).
Just as for ambiguity aversion, one can deﬁne the relation “more ambiguity seeking” as
in Deﬁnition 7, but for agents with ambiguity seeking preferences (ie. using maxima
rather than minima).
4.3.2 Separating doxastic attitude and ambiguity attitude Decision theorists often
want their models to separate out the utility elements in decision making (which, under
the classical theory, capture risk attitude) from the elements representing the agent’s
beliefs, or more generally his doxastic state, and, in the case of models of ambiguity,
to separate each of these from the element prescribing ambiguity attitude (for example
Ghirardato et al. (2004) and especially Klibanoff et al. (2005)). It is worth seeing how
this can be done in the proposed model.
Under the proposed model, the doxastic state of the agent (very roughly, his “be-
liefs”) is comprised not only of his best estimate of the probabilities, but of his con-
ﬁdence in these estimates. However, as suggested at the beginning of Section 3, the








since (g) > (f).
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conﬁdence is adequately represented by an order on the set of probability functuions:
it is the order restriction of the implausibility measure (Deﬁnition 2), rather than the
implausibility measure per se, which represents the agent’s doxastic states.12 By con-
trast, the ambiguity attitude of the agent is properly captured by what the implausibility
measure adds to its order restriction: it relates the agent’s conﬁdence, represented by
the order on the space probability functions, to choices, and in particular to the stakes
required for different probability functions to play a role in the evaluation of a prospect.
A simple reformulation of representation (1) will make it clear that this is indeed a
separation of beliefs and ambiguity attitude. Given an order restriction 6 on the space
of probability functions (), deﬁne  to be the set of subsets of () such that, for
any p 2 (), there is a unique C 2  with q 2 C iff q 6 p. It is easy to see that
one can generate the order 6 given :  is thus an equivalent representation of the
agent’s doxastic state. Now, it is clear that an implausibility measure d whose order
restriction is 6 generates a function D : <60 [ f1g !  such that D(r) = C iff, for
all p 2 (), d(p) 6 r iff p 2 C (in fact, D(r) = d 1([0;r])). Conversely, from such
a function, one can retrieve the implausibility measure: D represents precisely what
the implausibility measure adds above its order restriction. Of course, representation










Under this reformulation, the separation of ambiguity attitude and doxastic state
is clear: the doxastic state is the range of D, the ambiguity attitude is the function D
itself.
4.3.3 A co-efﬁcient of ambiguity aversion In fact, not only is the D introduced
above the appropriate representation of the ambiguity attitude, it can be thought of
as an analogue of the Arrow-Pratt co-efﬁcient of risk-aversion. First of all, it is an
immediate consequence of Theorem 2 that 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2 if
and only if D1(r)  D2(r) for all r 2 <60. Secondly, the ambiguity premium can
be expressed as a function of D: it is not too difﬁcult to see that, for any f 2 A,
(f) =
P
s2S u(f(s)):pc(s)   minp2D(b(f)c)
P
s2S u(f(s)):p(s), where pc is the
centre probability. That is, the ambiguity premium can be expressed as a function of
D, the utility and the doxastic state , just as the risk premium can be approximated
by a function of the co-efﬁcient of risk aversion.
Of course, the function D and its relation to the ambiguity premium takes a very
different form from the traditional co-efﬁcient of risk aversion and Arrow-Pratt approx-
imation, and indeed from the only other co-efﬁcient of ambiguity aversion proposed in
the literature (to our knowledge), namely, that of Klibanoff et al. (2005), which mimics
the Arrow-Pratt notion quite closely: their co-efﬁcient is basically the equivalent of
the Arrow-Pratt co-efﬁcient, but takes as its argument expected utilities over ﬁrst-order
probabilities (see also Section 4.4). This difference does not necessarily count against
the proposal that D be thought of as a co-efﬁcient of ambiguity aversion.
12In a companion paper (Hill, 2009), we consider representation results yielding only the order, and com-
pare them to cardinal representation results of the sort obtained here.
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First of all, ambiguity differs risk insofar as it involves the question of the decision-
makers’ beliefs (and his conﬁdence in them). The proposed co-efﬁcient explicitly
brings in this aspect, insofar as it takes values in sets of probabilities (representing the
probability judgements of which the agent is conﬁdent to a certain degree). Secondly,
there are some well-known problems with the Arrow-Pratt analysis of risk aversion – in
particular, plausible risk aversion over modest stakes implies implausible risk aversion
over large states Rabin (2000) – and it would certainly not be surprising if co-efﬁcients
of ambiguity aversion which are modelled on the Arrow-Pratt co-efﬁcient suffer from
similar problems. Finally, the proposed co-efﬁcient and analysis of ambiguity has all
the advantages of not relying on local methods. Whereas the Arrow-Pratt approxima-
tion is but an approximation, which is exact only in special cases and which can be
used only under certain conditions, the expression of ambiguity aversion in terms of
the proposed co-efﬁcient of ambiguity aversion is always exact.
4.4 Related literature
In Gajdos et al. (2008), the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model is extended to incor-
porate different sets of probability functions in the evaluation of acts. However, there,
the appropriate sets of probabilities are derived from an “objective” set of probability
functions (modelling information), which is given exogeneously; by contrast, here the
variation in the sets of probability functions used is generated endogeneously, by the
implausibility measure and the stakes of the act. Gajdos et al. (2008) propose notions
of comparative imprecision aversion and imprecision premium, which are difﬁcult to
relate to the notions proposed here, because they rely on the exogeneously given sets
of probabilities.
The proposal here models the agent’s conﬁdence by a structure on top of the set of
probabilities. The most popular model of this type in the literature employs a probabil-
ity over the set of probabilities and evaluates acts using by the expected value (under
the second-order probabilities) of a transform of the expected utilities of the act (under
the ﬁrst-order probabilities) (Klibanoff et al., 2005; Nau, 2006; Seo, 2007). Insofar as
both those models and the one proposed here involve a structure on top of the set of
probabilities, there are many analogies between the results obtained; however, there
are also some signiﬁcant differences. Technically, of course, a probability measure
over a space does not have the same properties as an order, or an implausibility mea-
sure: additivity, for one, plays no role here. Conceptually, the interpretations do not
seem to correspond either: whereas a probability over probability functions can and
often is thought of as a second-order belief, one cannot think of an order over the set
of probabilities as a second-order belief, without breaking with the Bayesian principle
that beliefs are represented by probabilities. Thus the interpretation as a measure of the
degree of conﬁdence. It follows that the proposal made here, contrarily to the one cited
above, does not rely on or link into the literature on the reduction axiom and two-stage
lotteries (Segal, 1990; Halevy, 2007). For further comparison between the models on
detailed points, see Sections 3, 4.1.4, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
The intuition involved in the current proposal is not unrelated to that involved in the
literature on robustness (for example Hansen and Sargent (2001); for an axiomatisation
of a generalisation of this model, see Maccheroni et al. (2006)). There, as here, there
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is best estimate probability or model (the “reference probability”, corresponding to our
centre probability). There, as here, the idea is that the decision-maker takes into ac-
count probabilities (or model speciﬁcations) which differ from this probability. There,
just as here, there is a single parameter which determines the extent to which other
probabilities are involved (the robustness parameter  in Hansen and Sargent (2001);
D here, see Section 4.3.3). However, there are differences between the proposals. First
and foremost, the functional forms are different. For one, Hansen and Sargent take the
inﬁmum over the whole space of probabilities, whereas we use restricted but variable
sets of probabilities. Accordingly, they do not relate the set of probabilities involved
in a decision to what is at stake, but determine their “involvement” entirely from the
robustness parameter and the relative entropy. Finally, whereas their model is dynamic,
we have only presented a static model here (though see below).
To our knowledge, the only suggestion involving a similar structure on the set of
probabilities is by Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982). They introduce a measure of “epis-
temic reliability” on the set of probabilities, and suggest that, in any decision, the
decision-maker should chose a level of epistemic reliability, and then make his choice
according to the maxmin decision rule over the set of probabilities whose reliability is
greater than this level. The notion of “epistemic reliability” appears to be the dual of
the notion of “implausibility measure” used here, and the use of the minmax rule over a
variable set of probability functions is an important common point between this paper
and Gärdenfors and Sahlin’s. However, they do not specify how the desired level of
epistemic reliability is to be chosen, and they do not relate it to the notion of stakes as
we do; consequently, they do not propose a representation theorem nor any notion of
comparative ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, in a choice over a set of acts, Gärden-
fors and Sahlin use the same set of probabilities to evaluate all acts, whereas under (1),
different sets of probabilities will be used if the acts have different stakes.
Finally, let us note that the order restriction of the implausibility measure resembles
the order on possible worlds used in the theory of belief revision (Gärdenfors, 1988),
and which is supposed to represent the “epistemic entrenchment” of particular beliefs
– approximately, how unwilling one is to surrender the belief. Of course, the notion
of conﬁdence and that of epistemic entrenchment are related: the less willing one is to
surrender a belief, the more conﬁdence one has in it. However, whereas the literature
on belief revision considers only the epistemic entrenchment of propositional beliefs
(eg. it will rain tomorrow), here we are interested in the conﬁdence in one’s subjec-
tive probabilities (eg. the probability that it will rain tomorrow is greater than 0.5).
Nevertheless, the relationship is worth noting, because the question of change in epis-
temic entrenchment has been quite extensively studied by theorists of belief revision
(by, among others: Rott (2003); Hill (2008)), and this literature contains suggestions
as to how to deﬁne dynamic operators for the model of conﬁdence proposed here.
5 Application
We close the paper with a simple portfolio-style example. This is aimed at helping the
reader to get concrete idea of the notions introduced in this paper, and at illustrating
how the framework may be used in applications. Many writers on ambiguity, not least
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Figure 2: The options
!1 !2 !3 !4
H 3 3 1 1
A 4 1 4 1
Gajdos et al. (2008) and Klibanoff et al. (2005), provide examples of applications of
theirmodels, notingthepossibleimportanceofambiguiyforunderstandingphenomena
such as the equity premuim puzzle or home biais (see Klibanoff et al. (2005) for further
references). We shall consider a simple version of the latter phenomenon, to which
our model seems particularly appropriate, given the intuition that investors are less
conﬁdent in their judgements regarding foreign markets than in those concerning the
home market.
In the example, the agent has one unit of wealth which he must invest and there
are two types of stocks on offer (H: in the home market; A: in the foreign market), the
returns of which are given in Figure 2. The problem is to decide what proportion a
of his budget to invest in the home stock (he will invest the rest in the foreign stock).
The agent has beliefs and conﬁdence represented by the following order on the set of
probability functions. He is fully conﬁdent that the event that the home market stock
yields returns (f!1;!2g) is independent from the event that the foreign market stock
yields returns (f!1;!3g), so each probability function which he considers not totally
implausible can be associated with a unique pair (p1;p2), where p1 is a probability of
f!1;!2g and p2 is a probability of f!1;!3g. Under his best estimate, there is a 0.7
probability that the home stocks will yield returns and a 0.8 probability that the foreign
ones will yield returns: the centre probability is (0:7;0:8). The other probabilities are
farther from these, the less implausible they are: for any c;d 2 <>0, if d > c, then
(0:7+d;0:8+3:d)  (0:7 d;0:8 3:d) > (0:7 c;0:8 3:c)  (0:7+c;0:8+3:c).
The difference by a factor of 3 represents the fact that the agent is less conﬁdent of his
judgement about the foreign markets: the implausibility that the probability of returns
on the home stock is 0.05 lower than his best estimate is the same as the implauability
that the probability of returns in the foreign stock is 0.15 lower than his best estimate.
Note that each probability function is uniquely characterised by the difference between
the probability of yield of the home stocks and his best estimate (the c and d above).
We take a utility function displaying constant absolute risk aversion, which is nor-
malised so that u(5) = 0 and u(0) =  5; ie.
u(x) =
5
1   e 5: :(e 5:   e :x)
where  is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion.
Note that in this simple example, the stakes of all acts are the same, so the con-
tribution of ambiguity aversion is resumed in the set of probabilities corresponding to
these stakes. As noted above, this set is characterised by a positive real number  (it is
the set of probabilities f(0:7 + c;0:8 + 3:c);(0:7   c;0:8   3:c)j c 6 g for some ).
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To consider the effects of different degrees of ambiguity aversion on choice, it sufﬁces
to consider the choices for different values of .
Figure 3: Optimal fraction a of budget allocated to H
As risk aversion increases, for
ﬁxed ambiguity aversion ( =
0:04)
As ambiguity aversion in-















Once these assumptions have been made, it is straightforward to perform com-
parative statics on the co-efﬁcient of risk aversion () and the parameter representing
ambiguity aversion (). Typical examples of the effects of risk aversion on investment
in H for a given value of the ambiguity aversion parameter, and of the effects of ambi-
guity aversion for a given value of the co-efﬁcient of risk aversion are given in Figure 3.
As risk aversion goes up, the agent invests more in the home stock. However, the same
effect occurs if risk aversion is held ﬁxed, and ambiguity aversion is increased. Recall
that as the parameter  increases, the agent is using probability functions which are
more implausible with respect to both stocks. However, the set of possible probability
values for the event that the foreign stocks yield returns is expanding faster than the
corresponding set for the event that the home stock yields returns: thus the movement
away from the foreign stock. Of course, this is the behaviour that corresponds to home
biais.13
In fact, the strength of the effect of the agent’s ambiguity aversion depends on his
risk aversion. At low or moderate levels of risk aversion, differences in ambiguity
aversion have important effects on the investment choice. By contrast, when the risk
aversion is high, it dominates the choice, and differences in ambiguity aversion have
only modest effects. This can be seen in Figure 4, which plots the optimum investment
in H against ambiguity aversion, for different levels of risk aversion.
13Note that the foreign stock is more attractive than the home one in all aspects except ambiguity; so the
optimum portfolio for an ambiguity neutral (and risk averse) agent would be to diversify, but with a larger
investment in the foreign stock.
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Figure 4: Graph of optional fraction invested in H (a, on the y-axis) against ambiguity
aversion (d, on the x-axis). The lines correspond to risk aversion 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10
respectively (0.5: the line cutting the y-axis at the lowest point, to 10: the line cutting
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6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of the decision-maker’s conﬁdence in his probability
judgements in terms of an implausibility measure – a real-valued function on the set
of probability functions. A decision rule according to which the decision-maker eval-
uates acts using sets of probability functions which depend on what is at stake in the
choice of the act is axiomatised. The framework proposed yields a natural notion of
comparative aversion to lack of conﬁdence and of ambiguity premium. It is shown
that these notions are equivalent and can be characterised in terms of the implausibility
measure representing the agent’s conﬁdence; moreover they are equivalent to a notion
of ambiguity aversion which is close to those deﬁned elsewhere (Klibanoff et al., 2005;
Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002). Finally, it is shown, via an example, how to apply
this model to portfolio problems.
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A Properties of preferences
Here we recall the deﬁnitions of some basic properties on preference orders which were
used in Section 2.2. For further discussion, see for example Anscombe and Aumann
(1963); Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Gilboa et al. (2008). Let  be a preference
order on A; then:
Weak order  satisﬁes weak order if (1) for all f, g and h in A, if f  g and g  h,
then f  h and (2) for all f, g in A, f  g or g  f.
Non triviality  satisﬁes non triviality if there are elements f and g in A such that
f  g.
Independence  satisﬁes independence if, for all f, g and h in A, and for all a 2 <,
0 < a < 1, if f  g then af + (1   a)h  ag + (1   a)h.
C-independence  satisﬁes C-independence if, for all f, g in A, all constant acts
h 2 (X), and all a 2 <, 0 < a < 1, if f  g then af + (1   a)h  ag + (1   a)h.
Continuity  satisﬁes continuity if, for all f, g and h in A, the sets fa 2 [0;1]j af +
(1   a)h  gg and fa 2 [0;1]j af + (1   a)h  gg are closed in [0;1].
Monotonicity  satisﬁes monotonicity if, for any f;g in A, if f(s)  g(s) for all s
in S, then f  g.
Uncertainty Aversion  satisﬁes uncertainty aversion if, for all f, g in A, and all
a 2 <, 0 < a < 1, if f  g then af + (1   a)g  f.
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. By A1 and A2, there is a utility u, unique up to positive afﬁne
transformation, representing the restriction of  to the constant acts. Given the unique-
ness, we can suppose that u is zeroed; ie. that it is picked so that u() = 0.
For any r, from A1 it follows that r satisﬁes non triviality, weak order and con-
tinuity, which, in conjunction with A3, implies that there is a closed and convex set
of probability functions Cr and a utility ur representing r by the MMEU formula
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004). By A4, the ur are a positive
afﬁne transformations of u for all r, and Cr  Cr0 for all r 6 r0 such that there exists




r0 (Ghirardato et al., 2004, Proposition 6). Deﬁne
d(p) as follows: for any p 2 (), d(p) = inf Crst:
p2Cr
r (where the convention is taken
that the inﬁmum is 1 if the set is empty). By Lemma 1 (below) and A4, frj p 2 Crg
is closed, so p 2 Cd(p). By the stipulation that the utility function is zeroed and axiom
A6, d 1(0) contains just one element.
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Now let us show that d is continuous. It sufﬁces to show that, for any r <
supp st: d(p)6=1 d(p), the inverse image under d of [0;r] is closed and the inverse image
of [0;r) is open. The ﬁrst part is immediate: d 1([0;r]) = Cr, which is closed. As
for the second part, it sufﬁces to show that if p 2 (X) is on the boundary of Cr, then
d(p) = r (by the contrapositive, it follows that, if d(p) < r, then d(p) < s < r for
some s, so p 2 int(Cs)  Cs  Cr; hence it is in an open ball in d 1([0;r))). Con-
sider a probability function p on the boundary of Cr. Recall that we are working in the
space ba(S) of ﬁnitely additive real-valued set functions on S, under the weak topol-
ogy (this notation is borrowed from Dunford and Schwartz (1958, Deﬁnition IV.5.2)).
By a separation theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, 5.67), there is a continuous lin-
ear functional  on ba(S) and  2 < such that (p) 6  6 (q) for all q 2 Cr.
Since S is ﬁnite (so ba(S) and B(S) are ﬁnite-dimensional), ba(S) is isometrically
isomorphic to B(S), the space of bounded real-valued functions on S (Dunford and
Schwartz, 1958, IV.13.5 and IV.5.3); hence there is a real-valued function F such that
(q) =
P
F(s)q(s) for any q 2 ba(S). Consider the act f such that u(f(s)) = F(s)
for all s 2 S, and the constant act  2 X such that u() = . By construction and
A4,  r0 f for all r0 6 r, and  d(p) f; by A5, it follows that d(p) > r. However,
p 2 Cr, so d(p) = r, as required.
The other properties of the representation are straightforward to check. Note in
particular that, because every act has a certainty equivalent (thanks to A1) and constant
acts are evaluated the same way by all r for every r, the representations of the r
extend immediately to a representation of .
Uniqueness comes from the uniqueness of the EU and MMEU results.
Lemma 1. Under the axioms in Theorem 1 (A1–A6), for any r 2 <, Cr =
T
r0>r Cr0.




r0 for all r0 > r
and the Lemma is trivially true. Suppose that this is not the case. By A4, 
r0
r
for all r0 > r so Cr  Cr0 for all i. Suppose, for reductio, that Cr (
T
r0>r Cs, so
that there exists a point (probability) p = 2 Cr, but p 2
T
r0>r Cr0. Under the weak
topology on ba(S), ba(S) is locally convex (Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, §V.3), and
the set of ﬁnitely additive probability functions is compact, so Cr is a closed, compact,
convex set. By a separation theorem (Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, V.3.9), there is a
continuous linear functional  on ba(S) and  2 < such that (p) 6  < (q) for
all q 2 Cr. As in the proof of Theorem 1, there is a real-valued function F such that
(q) =
P
F(s)q(s) for any q 2 ba(S). Consider the act f such that u(f(s)) = F(s)
for all s 2 S and the constant act  2 X such that u() = . By construction and
A4,  r0 f for all r0 > r but  r f, contradicting A5; hence Cr =
T
r0>r Cr0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let the assumptions of the theorem be satisﬁed.
(i) implies (ii). For some f 2 A and c 2 (X), suppose that f 1 c. By (1),
f 1
r c for all r 6 1(f). By (i), it follows that f 2
r c for all r 6 1(f). But since
the preferences are represented using the same utilities, 1(f) = 2(f), and f 2 c.
(ii) implies (iii). For any f 2 A, f 1 cf+( 1(f)), so by (ii), f 2 cf+( 1(f)).
So 2(f) 6 1(f).
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(iii) implies (ii). Evident.
(ii) implies (iv). If d1(p) = 0, there is nothing to check, and if d1(p) = 1, then
p appears at the top of the order restriction, so d2(p) = 1. Consider the remaining
case, where d1(p) is a non-zero real number. For any f 2 A and c 2 (X) such that
f 1
d1(p) c, it follows from (1) that f 1
r c for any r 6 d1(p). By Deﬁnition 2, this
means that [f + (1(f)   r)]1 + (r   1(f)) 1 c for every r 6 d1(p), which is
equivalent to f + (1(f)   r) 1 c + (1(f)   r) for every r 6 d1(p). So, by (ii)
and the fact that 1(f) = 2(f), f 2
r c for all r 6 d1(p). By representation (1),
and the fact that the preferences are represented with the same utility, it follows that
d2(p) > d1(p).
(iv) implies (i). Consider any f, g in A and  2 < with f 1
r g for all r 6
. By representation (1), this assumption implies that for any r 6 , MMEU with
fp 2 () : d1(p) 6 rg yields a weak preference for g over f. However, since the
representations share the same order restriction on () and d1(p) 6 d2(p) for all p 2
(), for any real number s, there is a number s0 6 s such that fp 2 () : d2(p) 6
sg = fp 2 () : d1(p) 6 s0g. It follows that each of sets fp 2 () : d2(p) 6 rg
for all r 6  equals some fp 2 () : d1(p) 6 r0g, where r0 6 . By representation
(1), it follows that f 2
r g for all r 6 .
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